A plain-English guide for Saudi government entities, critical infrastructure and the companies that supply them.
If your organisation was aligned to Saudi Arabia’s Essential Cybersecurity Controls in 2018, you are not automatically aligned to them now. The controls were rewritten in 2024, and in 2026 the authority behind them published a detailed guide to implementing them. This piece starts with that authority, because to understand the controls you need to understand who wrote them and why. Then it covers who must comply, what changed, and what each change means for the evidence you hold.
The National Cybersecurity Authority
The National Cybersecurity Authority (NCA) is the Kingdom’s national authority for cybersecurity. It was established by Royal Decree in 2017. Its role is both regulatory and operational. It writes the national cybersecurity strategy, frameworks and controls and checks compliance with them, and it also runs national cyber defence and incident response.
Within a year it had published the first edition of the Essential Cybersecurity Controls (ECC-1:2018), the minimum that every national organisation in its scope must meet. It has since built a family of specialist controls around them, including the Critical Systems Cybersecurity Controls (CSCC), the Cloud Cybersecurity Controls (NCA CCC), the controls for organisations’ social media accounts (OSMACC) and the Operational Technology Cybersecurity Controls (NCA OTCC). The ECC is the foundation the others build on.
Why NCA deserves credit
It’s worth saying plainly: in a few years, NCA has built one of the most complete national cybersecurity programmes anywhere. In 2024 the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the United Nations agency for digital technologies, placed Saudi Arabia in Tier 1, “role-modelling”, in its Global Cybersecurity Index, which measures more than 190 countries across legal, technical, organisational, capacity-building and cooperation measures. In 2025 the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook ranked the Kingdom first in the world on its cybersecurity indicator. A ranking measures a country’s whole effort, but NCA is at the centre of it.
What stands out most is how much NCA shares. Its new Guide to Essential Cybersecurity Controls Implementation (GECC-2:2026) takes every control in turn and gives its objective, the tools that help, how to implement it and the deliverables an assessor can expect to see. Few regulators tell you so plainly what good evidence looks like. NCA is clear that the guide is an illustrative model rather than the only way to comply, and that an assessor can ask for other evidence. Even so, it is the best starting point you will find.
Who must comply
ECC-2:2024 applies to:
- government agencies in the Kingdom, including ministries, authorities and establishments, and their affiliated companies and entities, inside and outside the Kingdom;
- private-sector organisations that own, operate or host Critical National Infrastructure (CNI).
NCA also encourages every other organisation in the Kingdom to use the controls as best practice, and many do, because the ECC is the national reference point. If you supply government or CNI, expect their supplier questionnaires to ask about it: domain 4 requires them to set cybersecurity requirements in their contracts with third parties.
If you know UK Cyber Essentials
UK readers will notice the similar names: the Essential Cybersecurity Controls, and the UK’s Cyber Essentials. They have a lot in common. Each is the national baseline set by the national cyber authority, and each is aimed at government and the suppliers it relies on. The difference is depth.
| NCA ECC-2:2024 | UK Cyber Essentials | |
|---|---|---|
| Set by | National Cybersecurity Authority (NCA) | National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), delivered through IASME |
| Who it’s for | Government entities and their affiliates, and CNI owners, operators and hosts; mandatory by regulation | Any organisation; required for certain central government contracts under Procurement Policy Note 014 |
| What it covers | 4 domains, 28 subdomains, 108 main controls and 92 sub-controls: governance, people, technical defence, resilience, third parties and cloud | 5 technical controls: firewalls, secure configuration, security update management, user access control and malware protection |
Cyber Essentials covers the basic technical defences. The ECC covers how security is run across the whole organisation, from leadership and staffing to suppliers and business continuity. If you hold Cyber Essentials, much of that work counts towards ECC domain 2. It is a start, not the finish.
The shape has changed: four domains, not five
ECC-1:2018 had five main domains, 29 subdomains and 114 controls. ECC-2:2024 has four main domains, 28 subdomains, 108 main controls and 92 sub-controls:
- Cybersecurity Governance: strategy, the cybersecurity function, policies, roles, risk, compliance, review and audit, people and awareness.
- Cybersecurity Defence: assets, identity and access, systems and networks, email, mobile devices, data protection, cryptography, backups, vulnerabilities, penetration testing, monitoring, incidents, physical and web application security. Still by far the largest domain, with 15 of the 28 subdomains.
- Cybersecurity Resilience: cybersecurity built into business continuity.
- Third-Party and Cloud Computing Cybersecurity: suppliers, outsourcing, and cloud and hosting services.
The domain that went is the old fifth one, industrial control systems. Operational technology now has its own NCA standard, NCA OTCC, so if you run industrial systems you work from both.
What it means for your evidence: an assessment mapped to the 2018 numbering won’t line up with the 2024 one. Re-map before you re-assess, or the gaps you report won’t be the gaps that exist.
Staffing: every cybersecurity role, not just the senior ones
Under ECC-1, the requirement for full-time Saudi professionals covered the head of the cybersecurity function and the supervisory and critical positions under them. ECC-2 extends it: all cybersecurity positions are to be filled by full-time, qualified Saudi cybersecurity professionals.
What it means for your evidence: NCA’s guide asks for a detailed list of everyone whose work involves cybersecurity, direct employees and contractors alike, with each person’s contract type, title, role, experience and qualifications. It points to the Saudi Cybersecurity Workforce Framework (SCyWF) as the reference for roles. It is easy to answer “yes” to a staffing control and hard to prove on the day, so keep that list current.
Third parties and cloud: the same domain, a changed hosting rule
Supplier and cloud risk has had a domain of its own since 2018. The 2024 edition keeps it, with the same two subdomains. What changed is one control. ECC-1 said, in control 4-2-3-3, that an organisation’s information hosting and storage must be inside the Kingdom. ECC-2 deleted that control.
That doesn’t mean the expectation has gone. NCA’s 2026 guide still tells entities, under control 4-2-2, to make sure their information is hosted and stored within the Kingdom, and to state hosting and storage location in their cloud security policy (4-2-1). Data residency can also come from other Saudi rules, such as the Saudi Personal Data Protection Law. If you assumed the 2024 change freed you to host abroad, check again.
What it means for your evidence: the guide is specific here. It expects:
- an approved third-party cybersecurity policy;
- signed contract samples showing confidentiality clauses, secure removal of your data at the end of the service, and incident communication procedures;
- for cloud, an approved cloud and hosting policy, a list of hosted services with their data classification, and evidence from the provider that your environment is separated from other customers’ environments.
What to do next
- Read NCA’s guide alongside the controls. It tells you the deliverables an assessor can expect, control by control. Start with the implementation guide and the ECC-2:2024 controls.
- Re-map, don’t restart. Most of your 2018 evidence still counts. Map it to the 2024 domains and subdomains first, then assess.
- Check the governance evidence you’ve assumed. Staffing, policy approval by the head of the entity or their delegate, and the supervisory committee are easy to claim and need documents behind them.
- Recheck where your data lives. Read 4-2-1 and 4-2-2 in the guide before you rely on the deleted 2018 control.
- If you’re regulated by the Saudi Central Bank, do SAMA CSF at the same time. The two overlap heavily, and running them separately means gathering the same evidence twice. See our guide to SAMA CSF.
How we approach it
In 786 Cyber, the NCA ECC-2 assessment follows the 2024 domains, and the evidence for each control comes from your own systems wherever it can. Identity and MFA status comes from Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace, assets and vulnerabilities from the platform’s own scanning, and cloud posture from a read-only connection. Gather the evidence once and it counts everywhere it applies, including SAMA CSF and ISO 27001.
A personal note
I have worked with Gulf banks, regulators and critical infrastructure since 2008, and I have watched the Kingdom's approach to cybersecurity change faster than almost anywhere else. NCA's choice to publish not just the controls but a guide to the evidence it expects is the kind of openness that lifts a whole sector. It turns compliance from guesswork into something you can plan for. That is the principle we built 786 Cyber on: be clear about what is evidenced and what is only declared, and keep the evidence current, so that trust follows.
The takeaway
ECC-2:2024 is mandatory for Saudi government entities and CNI, broader than any baseline UK readers will know, and better documented than most, thanks to NCA’s own guide. Re-map your 2018 work rather than starting again, take the staffing and hosting changes seriously, and use the guide’s expected deliverables as your evidence checklist.
